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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN A. MA,V"SON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. .. 
11658 
.J. G. INVESTMENT CO., ) 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by appellant, hereinafter referred 
to as "plaintiff," against J. G. Investment Corporation, 
respondent, hereinafter referred to as "defendant," for 
an order requiring defendant to remove obstructions 
placed in a roadway and to remove a fence at the end 
of a right of way which divides defendant's property 
from adjacent property in question. 
1 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable .Marcellus 
K. Snow and after the trial the Court made Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that plaintiff had no 
right, title or interest in and to the raodway and gave 
a judgment of dismissal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks to have the trial court's Judg-
ment of Dismissal affirmed. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
The defendant agrees with the Statement of Facts 
as set forth in plaintiff's Brief with exception of the 
final paragraph which defendant contends is erroneous 
and with the exception that said statement does not set 
forth sufficient of the facts to adequately inform the 
court of the real matter in dispute. 
The facts clearly show that the defendant has 
acquired all of the separate rights in the right-of-way 
and the plaintiff has no remaining right in the prop-
erty described. 
The defendant admits that the structures as shown 
in Exhibits P-3 and P-4 protruded into the right-of-
way as described some 12 to 18 inches on each side but 
contend that they do not in any way interfere with 
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passage in the right-of-way. Defendant admits that 
there is a fence at the east end of the right of way as 
shown in Exhibits P-5 and P-6 which defendant erected 
in 1966 and it has continuously remained there. 
The defendant purchased 306.94 feet of property 
on both sides of the east end of the right-of-way de-
scribed, and at the same time it obtained a 2/5th interest 
in the right-of-way, all from Maxfield C. 'Vhitehead. 
Defendant also obtained a quit-claim deed from other 
abutting property owners at about the same time for 
what was thought to be another 2/5th interest out-
standing. 
The defendant proceeded to built apartments on 
both sides of the right-of-way. See Exhibits P-4, P-5, 
P-7, P-8, P-8, and P-10. The end of the right-of-way 
abutted against a vacant field, so the defendant built 
a fence along the east property line, including the east 
line of the right-of-way. The plaintiff subsequently 
bought the property, which has a right of access on both 
the north and south, immediately to the east end of 
the right-of-way in question and now claims he still 
has a I/ 5th interest in the right-of-way and wants to 
remove the fence for a third access to his newly-pur-
chased land. 
The plaintiff, after purchasing the I/5th interest 
in the right-of-way described, together with three pieces 
of land abutting thereto, sold one piece by warranty 
<lee<l to Perry S. and Margaret Bradley and the deed 
stated "together with a right-of-way over" without any 
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reservation of exception for himself in the right-of-way. 
He also sold one piece to his daughter Nilene Afton 
Mawson Eskelson, and subsequently by quit claim deed 
gave her a I/ 5th interest in the right-of-way which 
she later transferred back to him, which he now claims 
gives him his present interest. Defendant sold the final 
piece to Richard and Phyllis Allen by warranty deed, 
which also gave a right-of-way, but attempted to re-
tain the fee in the right-of-way. Defendant subsequent-
ly purchased this from Allen. See Exhibit P-11. 
The defendant found that .Maxfield C. Whitehead 
still claimed a 2/5th interest in the right-of-way as he 
had not deeded it away when he sold all his property 
abutting thereon. The defendant then obtained a quit 
claim deed on the other 2/5ths 'V'hitehead owned, giv-
ing defendant 5/5ths of the property in dispute. (See 
Findings of Fact R 52-56.) 
DEFENDANT'S POSITION 
The trial court's Judgment of dismissal of the 
plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT MADE EXTENSIVE FIND-
INGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA "r 
IN SUPPORT OF JUDGMENT AND PLAIN-
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TIFF DISPUTES ONLY ONE CONCLUSION 
AND NONE OF THE FINDINGS OF THE 
LO,l\TER COURT. 
Defendant does not dispute plaintiff's receipt of a 
II 5th interest in the right of way as it claims down 
thru the plaintiff part of its own title. After hearing 
all the evidence the court made extensive findings and 
conclusions. (R. 52-56.) Plaintiff has not attacked any 
of the findings of fact and his brief only indirectly 
attacks one conclusion set forth by the court. The court 
found: 
1. That plaintiff had transferred one of his three 
pieces of property to a Mr. and Mrs. Bradley, which 
deed stated "together with a right of way over" the 
property in question and described the property m 
question. (See R 48) of plaintiff's memorandum. 
2. That plaintiff transferred the second piece of 
property to his daughelr, Mrs. Eskelson. (R 53) 
3. That plaintiff transferred the third piece to 
Allens ( R. 53) . 
4. That plaintiff had absolutely nothing left. R. 
53). See findings and conclusions in detail (R-52 to 
R 56). 
The only dispute is the conclusion as to the effect of 
the original transfer to the Bradleys, whether or not 
there was anything left in the plaintiff after the transfer. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the findings 
should stand, as they have not been attacked, and with 
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the findings intact, there could not be a change of the 
conclusion of law as set forth, and the judgment should 
stand. This would also hold true of the findings show-
ing that the defendant had purchased all of the right-
of-way as there was no attack on these. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS OBTAINED ALL THE 
TITLE IN THE RIGHT-OF-WAY. 
The court so found. See number 10, R. 54. There 
is no dispute as to the testimony concerning the acqui-
sition of the right-of-ways from all other sources ' 
the acquisition down from plaintiff to Bradley then to 
Hamilton then to the defendant. 
The defendant cites 23 Am. J ur. 2d 292: 
"In some states the statutes in terms provide 
that transfers of land shall transfer all incidents 
except those expressly excepted." 
Here no exceptions were made. It further states on 
page 294: 
"It is well established that all easements ap-
purtenant to land conveyed passed to the gran-
tee,, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by 
the deed of conveyance, notwithstanding the deed 
does not purport expressly to include appuren-
tenances." (Emphasis supplied) 
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\¥here plaintiff deeded without reservation, ID53 
Utah Code Annotated As Amended provides at Title 
57, Chapter 1, Section 12, that a warranty deed 
"Shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee 
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named together with all the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto 
belonging with the covenants from the grantor, 
. . . any exceptions to such covenants may be 
briefly inserted ... " 
That is supported in the case of Pctrofesa v. Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad, llO U. 109 169 P.2d 
808. The court found that the defendant was not at-
tempting to preclude the plaintiff or his daughter from 
the right-of-way even though neither has any right left 
in it, and it admitted by even the plaintiff's own testi-
mony that he was able to drive to the end of the prop-
erty over which he originally had I/5th right, but wants 
to now connect it on and develop his land to the east. 
Plaintiff has included, as obstructions to be removed, 
some protrusions of 18 inches on the sides which are 
all abutted by the defendant's property in addition to 
the removal of the fence on the end. The exhibits clearly 
show that these protrusions are merely incidental and 
the fence is the main object to be removed so that the 
plaintiff can develop his lot to the east. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT OFFER THE 
WHOLE TRANSCRIPT AND THE COURT 
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MUST ASSU.ME THAT FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS WERE CORRECT. 
Plaintiff does not off er the whole transcript of the 
trial to prove his contentions, and it must be assume<l 
that the findings and conclusions were correct and based 
on proper evidence, as there is no evidence to refute 
them and none is cited except as to the dispute on the 
one conclusion. It is true that the defendant could have 
designated a further position of the record, but not 
having noted that it was omit,.ted until a later date, 
this was not done. The plaintiff still has the burden of 
showing that the original court proceedings were in 
error, and there is no evidence in the record to show 
that there was error. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO CONTROVERSY AS PLAIN-
TIFF AND GRANTEES ARE NOT PRECLUD-
ED FROM USE OF RIGHT-OF-WAY FOR 
ALL LAND WHICH PLAINTIFF OWNED. 
The fact that the defendant has not precluded any-
one who is remotely connected with the plaintiff from 
using the full length of the right-of-way makes the 
whole controversy moot as plaintiff has no other right 
than the use of th eright-of-way. The small protrusion 
on the sides does not hinder passage as there still re-
mains a passageway about 30 feet in width. He can 
use the full length all but the last 6 inches of the 
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right-of-way, which is the width of the fence, and to 
give him the additional 6 inches of use would add noth-
ing. It would do irreparable damage to the defendant 
in its use of the property, destroying the protection 
for the children and impairing the value thereof. See 
Conclusion 4 - R 55. To permit this with no contro-
versy would be a gross injustice. 
POINT V 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS CANNOT 
BE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE MORE THAN 
ORIGINALLY GRANTED. 
Even if it is assumed that the plaintiff still has 
his I/5th in the right-of-way, he would still not be 
entitled to have the fence on the dividing line between 
the defendant's property and his other property to the 
east removed. At the time the original right-of-way was 
created, the grantor only owned the property to the east 
end of the right-of-way and only contemplated that 
it would be used by those people having abutting prop-
property up to the end. To include the land east of the 
east end would be an enlargement of the use, which is not 
permitted. The defendant quotes 25 Am. J ur. 2nd 482-3 
See. 77: 
"However, no use may be made of the right-
of-way different from that established at the 
time of its creation so as to burden the servient 
estate to a greater extent than was contemplated 
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at the time of the grant ... nor may he develop 
the right-of-way into a public thoroughfare. 
A grant or reservation of a right to pass on a 
private way to one lot does not confer the right 
to pass further on the same way to another lot. 
Similarly, a right of way appurtenant to a par- ' 
ticular lot cannot be used as a mode of access 
to another lot to which it is not appurtenant." 
(Emphasis supplied. ) 
This cites as a footnote : 
"One having the right to use an alley for ac-
csess to certain property may not use it to trans-
port to such property goods for use on adjoining ' 
property." 
Taken from Percy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 357 P. ' 
271, 54 A2d 35. 
In the Utah case of Wood et al v. Ashby et al., 122 U. 
580 253 P.2d 351, the CO!J.rt held: 
"Since it is manifest that a grantee may re-
ceive only what a gr an tor has to give, def end-
ant' s rights are based upon the construction of 
the original Traugott deed to the plaintiff's 
d " pre ecessors. 
It also states: 
"It is also established in this state that a deed 
should be construed so as to effectuate the in-
tentions and desires of the parties as manifested 
by the language made use of in the deed." 
The Utah case of Nielsen v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 
696 28 CJ S on Easements, Sec. 65 ( b) 732 states: 
' 
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"And when the resulting use will increase the 
burden upo1.1 the servient estate, the right to the 
easement will be extinguished." 
In 10 ALR 962, Right of Way, it states: 
a general rule if the increased or addi-
tional use or burden brought about by the sub-
division of a dominant tenement materially bur-
dens the servient estate, the courts will not allow 
the right-of-way easement to pass to the subse-
quent purchasers of the subdivided parts." 
In 3 ALR 3d 1258, on page 1259 it states: 
"The determination of the extent and reason-
ableness of use of a right-of-way created by ex-
press grant necessarily involves a construction 
of the grant. Several basic principles govern: 
1. The grant must be construed in the light of 
the situation of the property and surrounding 
circumstances in order to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the parties. 
2. If the language of a grant is clear and free 
from doubt, such language is not the subject of 
interpretation, and no resort to extrinsic facts 
and circumstances may be made to modify the 
clear terms of the grant. 
3. The past behavior of the parties in connec-
tion with the use of the right-of-way may be re-
garded as a practical construction of the use of 
h " t e way ... 
At 1260 from the same treatise it provides that the 
rule that the right of way cannot be used to burden the 
servient tenement to an extent greater than was con-
templaetd. 
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At 1261 also from 3 ALR, it provides: 
"In assessing the chances of obtaining a judi-
cial limitation of the use of 'unreasonable,' coun-
sel will want to examine the terms of the grant 
and to investigate, as far as possible, the situation 
of the parties and of the land at the time the grant 
was made, as well as the practical construction 
given thereto by the parties over the years, since 
all these matters are relevant to the determina-
tion of the scope of the easement." 
At 1270 of th esame work it states: 
"And the principle that the servient tenement 
may not be subjected to new and unreasonable 
burdens not contemplated by the parties has also 
been recognized in a number of other cases." 
Therefore, it is submitted that even if plaintiff 
still owned a I/5th interest in the right-of-way, it is 
clear from the law that he would not have the right 
to expand the use over that originally contemplated at 
the time that th egrant was originally made, as the 
original grantor did not own the property to the east 
which the plaintiff is now trying to include, and in no 
circumstances should the plaintiff be permitted to en· 
large the use and require the defendant to remove the 
fence. 
CONCLUSION 
From all the circumstances in the case, the defend· 
ant concludes that the judgment of the lower court 
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should be affirmed as he owns the fee title to the prop-
erty, and even without fee title the plaintiff is not 
entitled to enlarge the use on the right-of-way to in-
clude more than that originally contemplated by the 
grantor creating the right-of-way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
16 East Stratford Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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